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COMMENTS
DON’T (TOWER) DUMP ON FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: PROTEST SURVEILLANCE
UNDER THE FIRST AND FOURTH
AMENDMENTS
Ana Pajar Blinder*
Government surveillance is ubiquitous in the United States and can
range from the seemingly innocuous to intensely intrusive. Recently, the
surveillance of protestors—such as those protesting against George Floyd’s
murder by a police officer—has received widespread attention in the media
and in activist circles, but has yet to be successfully challenged in the courts.
Tower dumps, the acquisition of location data of cell phones connected to
specific cell towers, are controversial law enforcement tools that can be used
to identify demonstrators. This Comment argues that the insufficiency of
Fourth Amendment protections for protesters being surveilled by government
actors—by tactics such as tower dumps—can be solved by conducting
independent First Amendment analyses. A multi-factor balancing test can
assist the courts as they consider the scope and pervasiveness of technology
such as tower dumps against the potential chilling effects on First
Amendment-protected activity, providing a framework to assess the
constitutionality of surveillance technology used during mass protests.
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INTRODUCTION
Officer Derek Chauvin kneeled on George Floyd’s neck for nearly eight
minutes,1 reigniting momentum to protest police brutality and systemic
racism.2 A wave of local, national, and, ultimately, global protests ensued.
The moment transformed into a movement, with grassroots action and
accompanying social media conversation developing from focus on George
Floyd to a broader Black Lives Matter message.3 Drawing comparisons to
the United States civil rights movement of the 1960s, the protests in summer
2020 were responsive to similar violence and systemic racism plaguing Black
Americans of the past, but proved to be more intersectional and coalition
based.4
The Black Lives Matter demonstrations, however, were not immune to
governmental efforts to impede, infiltrate, or monitor activism. Instead, they
magnified the inextricability of protest and surveillance. Modern innovation

1
Prosecutors: Derek Chauvin Had Knee on George Floyd for 7:46, Not 8:46, CBS MINN.
(June 17, 2020, 10:42 PM), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2020/06/17/prosecutors-derek-ch
auvin-had-knee-on-george-floyd-for-746-not-846 [https://perma.cc/VQD4-ZKEM].
2
Eliott C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning that
Shows No Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.cnn.com/20
20/08/09/us/george-floyd-protests-different-why/index.html [https://perma.cc/JC65-RMXH].
3
Mary Blankenship & Richard V. Reeves, From the George Floyd Moment to a Black
Lives Matter Movement, in Tweets, BROOKINGS INST. (July 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/10/from-the-george-floyd-moment-to-a-black-lives-matter-move
ment-in-tweets [https://perma.cc/QM5A-HPPU].
4
Thomas J. Sugrue, 2020 is Not 1968: To Understand Today’s Protests, You Must Look
Further Back, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 11, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/hist
ory/2020/06/2020-not-1968 [https://perma.cc/P4HL-ABBE].
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has made these efforts more sophisticated, but even older forms of
technology were also used to stifle dissidence.5
Today, government infiltration into perceived dissident groups’
activities has been supplanted by advanced surveillance technologies
utilizing biometrics, cell phone tracking, and social media monitoring.6
Americans have dealt with policing perceived threats at the expense of
constitutional freedoms for a long time,7 but technology has changed how
aware individuals are of the government’s tactics. National security was
often invoked to justify surveillance in the past, as it is invoked now.8
However, today, the tools used by government actors are much further
reaching than they were earlier in the 20th century, creating more onerous
conditions and greater threats to free speech and association. The inevitable
collapse of the distinction between national security and domestic protest—
through methods such as designating domestic groups as terrorist
organizations—poses graver surveillance concerns and risks of First
Amendment infringements.9 For example, the Department of Justice
5

In the 18th century, fearing insurrectionist enslaved people, New York passed ordinances
requiring unaccompanied slaves to carry lanterns in the dark so they could be monitored. See
Dorothy Roberts & Jeffrey Vagle, Racial Surveillance Has a Long History, HILL (Jan. 4, 2016,
5:11 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/264710-racial-surveillance-has-a-long-history [h
ttps://perma.cc/LC84-DZHP]. In addition, in the 1960s, one of the FBI’s most notorious
surveillance campaigns, COINTELPRO, was designed to monitor what the Bureau, rather
capriciously, considered radical dissident groups. Targets included the Black Panthers and
Martin Luther King, Jr. See Stanford Univ., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. ENCYCLOPEDIA https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/federal-bur
eau-investigation-fbi [https://perma.cc/DQ4C-43Y2] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
6
Albert Fox Cahn & Zachary Silver, The Long, Ugly History of How Police Have Tracked
Protestors, FAST CO. (June 2, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90511912/the-long-uglyhistory-of-how-police-have-tracked-protesters [https://perma.cc/5MU5-E9TM].
7
Id.
8
Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3
(2004) (explaining how staving off the threat of terrorism is used to justify FISA’s broad
permission of warrantless electronic surveillance); L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth
Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its History and Limits, 6 VAND. L. REV. 1343,
1351–52 (2013) (discussing the role of the Fourth Amendment in national security).
9
“The First Amendment protects the rights of Americans who like spewing ‘hateful
speech’ and ‘assembling with others who share the same hateful views,’ so ‘unless an
organization engages solely in unprotected activity, such as committing crimes of violence,
any designation of a (U.S.-based) organization as a terrorist organization . . . would likely run
afoul of the First Amendment.’” Mike Levine, Trump Vows to Designate Antifa a Terrorist
Group. Here’s Why DOJ Officials Call That ‘Highly Problematic,’ ABC NEWS (June 1, 2020,
12:58 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-vows-designate-antifa-terrorist-group-her
es-doj/story?id=70999186 [https://perma.cc/ZWB8-W6QB].
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tenuously classified demonstrators as “Antifa” members, which the
administration sought to designate as a terrorist organization.10 Similarly, the
Drug Enforcement Administration was reportedly granted authority to
“conduct covert surveillance” to “assist to the maximum extent possible in
the federal law enforcement response to protests which devolve into
violations of federal law.”11
Technology can be helpful for protesters because it memorializes and
exposes instances of police violence, simplifies the mass organization and
coordination of demonstrations, and provides rapid communications to
fellow protestors on how to stay safe.12 But technology also facilitates
surveillance. The state is able to quickly track the movements of protestors
both through monitoring of social media chatter and through more invasive
tactics such as facial recognition software, drones, and surveillance towers.13
This Comment focuses on tower dumps, which are downloads of
cellular data acquired when cell phones connect to cell sites.14 When cell
phones are on, they scan for cell towers for connectivity and register location
information with the network about every seven seconds.15 This enables the
10
Attorney General William P. Barr’s Statement on the Death of George Floyd and Riots,
DEP’T OF JUST. (May 30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-pbarr-s-statement-death-george-floyd-and-riots [https://perma.cc/3BLK-UK6R] (“In many
places, it appears the violence is planned, organized, and driven by anarchistic and far left
extremists, using Antifa-like tactics, many of whom travel from out of state to promote the
violence.”).
11
Jason Leopold & Anthony Cormier, The DEA Has Been Given Permission to
Investigate People Protesting George Floyd’s Death, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 2, 2020, 6:48
PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/george-floyd-police-brutality-prot
ests-government [https://perma.cc/5YE3-YDVW] (citing Memorandum from Timothy J.
Shea, Acting Adm’r, Drug Enf’t Admin., to Deputy Att’y Gen. (May 31, 2020), https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/6935297-LEOPOLD-DEA-Memo-George-Floyd-Protests.h
tml [https://perma.cc/YJR5-VVMV]).
12
See Shira Ovide, How Social Media Has Changed Civil Rights Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/technology/social-media-protests.htm
l [https://perma.cc/4U47-R5R2]; Alex Hudson & Peter Price, How Is Technology Changing
Protests?, BBC (Apr. 12, 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/94515
21.stm [https://perma.cc/4S3P-2RLA].
13
Aaron Holmes, How Police Are Using Technology Like Drones and Facial Recognition
to Monitor Protests and Track People Across the US, BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2020, 9:58 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-police-use-tech-facial-recognition-ai-drones-2019-10
[https://perma.cc/RS4X-6EWU].
14
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
15
Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 228 (2011) (statement of the ACLU), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/senate_h
earing_mobile_tracking_may_2011_-_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E3L-KM4E] (citing In re
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generation of a person’s location data through cell site location information
(CSLI).16 Acquisition of information about multiple (or all) devices
connected to a cell tower at a certain interval is known as a tower dump. 17
For the proceeding reasons, tower dumps have become an increasingly
threatening form of government surveillance.
It is hard to avoid having one’s data acquired by a tower dump because
cell phones automatically connect to towers.18 There is no ability to
anonymize yourself with a mask or rely on glitches with facial recognition.
Options to protect digital privacy at protests include employing
technologically savvy safeguards such as turning off biometrics, encrypting
devices, turning off location services, using airplane mode, or more extreme
solutions like leaving your phone at home altogether.19 These safeguards
pose additional risks, as phones are not only inseparable from everyday
behavior,20 but are also important accountability mechanisms to record police
misconduct, summon help, or coordinate movements.21
Too much surveillance can seriously impede protests. Fearing the
systematization of protestors’ identifications, future retaliatory behavior, or
the surveillance itself, demonstrators become deterred from participating in
protests.22 The fear of government encroachment on protestor privacy has
Application of U.S. for an Ord. Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Recs.
to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304).
16
See Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The Increasing
Precision of Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth Amendment Protections,
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 173 (2016).
17
John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2013,
6:02 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spyingnsa-police/3902809 [https://perma.cc/3RCP-DQYM] (“A typical dump covers multiple
towers, and wireless providers, and can net information from thousands of phones.”).
18
Jess Remington, Police Use “Tower Dumps” to Collect Cell Phone Data Without a
Warrant, REASON (Dec. 4, 2013, 12:34 PM), https://reason.com/2013/12/04/police-use-towerdumps-to-collect-your-c [https://perma.cc/GJ6T-LAX5].
19
Alfred Ng, How to Maintain Your Digital Privacy at Protests, CNET (June 15, 2020,
12:56 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-to-maintain-your-digital-privacy-at-protests [htt
ps://perma.cc/EDU7-8UJZ].
20
See Lynne Peeples, Can’t Put Down the Phone? How Smartphones Are Changing Our
Brains – and Lives, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2018, 3:32 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach
/science/surprising-ways-smartphones-affect-our-brains-our-lives-ncna947566 [https://perma
.cc/F7B8-YUPD].
21
Matthew I. Lahana, Destined to Collide: Modern Protests and Warrantless Cell Phone
Search Exceptions, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 55, 56 (2012).
22
See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Williams v. San
Francisco (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2020) (No. CGC-20-587008) https://www.aclunc.org/
sites/default/files/2020.10.07-Williams-v.-SF-Complaint-filed_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWE
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severe chilling effects on demonstrators.23 Law enforcement, for example,
can request all the CSLI from towers to identify common cell phone numbers
when allegedly investigating a crime.24 Practically speaking, under the
auspices of identifying a single suspect of an alleged crime at a protest against
police brutality, law enforcement could track the locations of all attendees of
a protest.25 Protestors who have nothing to do with the supposed target or
purpose of the surveillance can still be grouped into the surveillance,
providing ample reason to fear future attendance.
If protests are seriously impeded, First Amendment infringement
follows. The Supreme Court has recognized that state actions which do not
facially stifle freedom of association can still have the effect of doing so and
thereby abridge First Amendment protections.26 While certain government
action may “appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties,”27 a closer
look can reveal otherwise, such as when surveillance impedes free speech
activity. Protestors who know they are under the relentless watch of the
government have rightful fears of participation in demonstrations. State
action surveilling protestors via tower dumps certainly “may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate.”28
The topic of surveillance is most often discussed in a Fourth
Amendment context, but whether the Fourth Amendment would provide
9-6KNV] (Plaintiff protestors allege the San Francisco Police Department defied city
ordinance and chilled free speech rights by employing dragnet surveillance of summer
protests); Umberto Bacchi & Avi Asher-Schapiro, Debate on Surveillance and Privacy Heats
Up as U.S. Protests Rage, REUTERS (June 1, 2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article
/uk-minneapolis-police-privacy-trfn/debate-on-surveillance-and-privacy-heats-up-as-u-s-prot
ests-rage-idUSKBN23902V [https://perma.cc/74RG-EC3B].
23
Bacchi & Asher-Schapiro, supra note 22.
24
Robinson Meyer, How the Government Surveils Cellphones: A Primer, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/how-the-governm
ent-surveils-cell-phones-a-primer/404818 [https://perma.cc/ZCS4-3FNN].
25
As historical records from cell tower dumps “provide a listing of any cell phones that
have utilized the cellphone tower for a particular time and date,” it is plausible law
enforcement would have little difficulty identifying a large number of attendees of a protest
while ostensibly searching for a specific individual. Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment
Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Criminal Complaint at 13, United States v. Capito (D.
Ariz. 2010) (No. 3:10-CR-8050)).
26
See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950) (“By exerting pressures
on unions to deny office to Communists and others identified therein, § 9(h) undoubtedly
lessens the threat to interstate commerce, but it has the further necessary effect of discouraging
the exercise of political rights protected by the First Amendment.”).
27
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
28
Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
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protection in the context of tower dumps is disputed.29 This Comment will
take a different approach. Regardless of the answer under a Fourth
Amendment analysis, tower dumps during mass protests can chill speech and
free association enough to warrant heavy scrutiny under a First Amendment
framework.30
Part I of this Comment outlines the tangible First Amendment harm
posed by government use of tower dumps to surveil protestors and how that
injury is conceptualized doctrinally. Despite a body of law established to
clarify freedom of association protections, First Amendment jurisprudence
has not directly or sufficiently addressed the problem in the context of protest
in the modern digital age, in large part due to the courts’ reliance on and
deference to Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part II argues that the Fourth
Amendment is an insufficient framework for courts to utilize when
addressing the First Amendment implications of technological surveillance
of protests. Finally, Part III illustrates how the doctrinal standard used for
freedom of association should be applied when the First Amendment is
implicated in novel privacy cases.31

29
Owsley, supra note 25, at 13 (“[T]he development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
. . . supports the position that Fourth Amendment protections extend to cell tower dumps.”);
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 104
(2013) (“When unfettered access to those methods raises the specter of a surveillance state,
courts have limited their use by applying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standards.”); Eric J. Struening, Checked in: Decreasing Fourth Amendment Protection
Against Real-Time Geolocation, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 561 (2015) (discussing how the Fourth
Amendment applies to real-time geolocation surveillance).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31
This Comment also advances its argument with the contextual awareness that while
tower dumps are one of the more dangerous ways of infringing on protestors’ rights, other
technologies used in combination can drive First Amendment harms. See Andy Greenberg &
Lily Hay Newman, How to Protest Safely in the Age of Surveillance, WIRED (May 31, 2020,
3:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-protest-safely-surveillance-digital-privacy
[https://perma.cc/6RZJ-C9PY]; William Roberts, US Law Enforcement Surveilled Protests
with Drones, Spy Planes, AL JAZEERA (June 11, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020
/6/11/us-law-enforcement-surveilled-protests-with-drones-spy-planes [https://perma.cc/892A
-5GUH]; Lulu Garcia-Navarro, How Authorities Can Use The Internet to Identify Protestors,
NPR (June 28, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/28/884351939/how-authorities
-can-use-the-internet-to-identify-protesters [https://perma.cc/RD5D-QWVN]. Tower dumps
are a timely and relevant example, but there are more possibilities for freedom of association
incursions. Facial recognition software, drone surveillance, iris-scanners, ShotSpotter
technology, audio surveillance systems, and surveillance cameras are among the many new
technologies and tools used by the government to surveil its citizens. Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy
Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 999
(2013).
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT HARM
This Part explains how certain government surveillance threatens free
speech. More specifically, this Part argues that the fear of tower dump
surveillance may pose a sufficient chilling effect for First Amendment
purposes. This Part then details the governing freedom of association
doctrine used by courts when speech is chilled, before clarifying that the
courts have neglected to apply this doctrine when government surveillance is
the subject of legal challenges.
A. THE BURDEN ON PROTEST

Protests play a valuable role in democratic society. Free speech,
assembly, and petition help a free society share ideas, create culture, debate,
dissent, disrupt, and even invite dispute.32 One scholar, Jack Balkin, posits
that “[a]lthough freedom of speech is deeply individual, it is at the same time
deeply collective because it is deeply cultural.”33 Central to these theories of
free speech is the right to protest. Some scholars go so far as to contend that
assembly is “at least as central to the process of self-governance as is free
speech and that assembly and petition were historically viewed as more
fundamental to a politically functioning society than speech.”34 One could
argue the very foundation of American ideals is predicated on the right to
protest.35 Protests demanding women’s right to vote, the March on
Washington and other venerable efforts of the civil rights movement, the
Stonewall riots, and anti-Vietnam protests all exist in the annals of history as
turning points in the slow turn toward progress.36
Further, protests advance self-governance by bolstering civic
participation and direct democracy, serving as “one particular public opinion
signal” that among other resolutions, “may influence[] elected

32

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
34
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L. REV. 978, 981 (2011).
35
Examples include the Boston Tea Party’s demands for representation and the drafters
of the First Amendment, borne of the American Revolution, and their understanding of the
role of protest in creating popular revolution. SMITHSONIAN INST., PROTEST & PATRIOTISM 5–
6, http://smithsonianeducation.org/educators/lesson_plans/protest_and_patriotism/si_protestand-patriotism.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HGA-AUVE].
36
Nick Carbone, Top 10 American Protest Moments, TIME (Oct. 12, 2011), http://conte
nt.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2096654_2096653_2096692,00.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/SR4P-WHVC].
33

2021]

DON'T DUMP FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

969

representatives.”37 Protests contribute to the marketplace of ideas38 through
the circulation of ideas that critique prevailing policies or respond to minority
dissent. Lastly, protests foster self-expression by allowing individuals to
form beliefs and then express them.39 Intrusions on this critical right to
protest pose a severe threat to fundamental liberties which form the bedrock
of societal participation.
Activist infrastructure has shifted in the digital age, making modern
protest ripe for First Amendment infringements. Civic engagement that once
relied on face-to-face interactions and traditional organization has been
replaced by electronic correspondence and amorphous, but adaptable,
networks.40 Integral to this digital organizing model is the use of cell phones,
which protestors use to make organizing more efficient and law enforcement
use to track demonstrations.41 As the Supreme Court has recognized, cell
phones are essential accessories in modern life and require greater privacy
protection than other physical belongings.42 The more regularly people use
cell phones, the more location data is stored on these omnipresent devices.43
Further, law enforcement take advantage of this data when tracking
individuals.44
Thus, technological advancements make way for innovative forms of
government surveillance that infringe on protesters’ First Amendment rights.
One example is tower dumps, a procedure which can “collect all of the
historical records that providers maintain from a specific
cell tower or towers.”45 Tower dumps, like drone surveillance, facial
recognition software, license plate scanners, and social media tracking, are
37
Ruud Wouters & Stefaan Walgrave, Demonstrating Power: How Protest Persuades
Political Representatives, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV. 361, 362 (2017).
38
See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 821
(2008) (describing the marketplace of ideas as the idea that free speech creates a “competitive
environment in which the best ideas will ultimately prevail.”).
39
See Thomas I. Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
40
Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 745 (2008).
41
Kim Zetter, How Cops Can Secretly Track Your Phone, INTERCEPT (July 31, 2020), htt
ps://theintercept.com/2020/07/31/protests-surveillance-stingrays-dirtboxes-phone-tracking [h
ttps://perma.cc/2BTU-4HQL].
42
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
43
Stuart A. Thompson and Charlie Warzel, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opini
on/location-tracking-cell-phone.html [https://perma.cc/E63P-Q2RG].
44
Zetter, supra note 41.
45
Owsley, supra note 25, at 6.
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useful surveillance tools for law enforcement,46 but are uniquely dangerous
and increasingly used.47 They provide an increasingly precise amount of
tracking information, including the location and pattern of movements at
specific time periods, relative to the location of fixed cell towers.48 While
individual tower dumps are less accurate at location tracking than GPS,49 cell
tower triangulation—tower dumps at multiple cell towers—can help identify
individuals across cities and provide bgreatter location accuracy,50 at times
within three-fourths of a mile.51 As cell towers are in closer proximity to one
another in densely populated urban areas, phone location estimations are
more accurate in cities than in rural areas.52 The majority of large protests in
summer 2020 took place in cities.53 Therefore, tower dumps provide law
enforcement increasingly accurate information about protesters’ locations
and have become a very effective surveillance tool.
46
See Greenberg & Newman, supra note 31; Roberts, supra note 31; Garcia-Navarro,
supra note 31.
47
The major cellphone providers report thousands of tower dump requests per year. See
AT&T, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 3 (Aug. 2020), https://about.att.com/ecms/dam/csr/2019/libr
ary/transparency/2020-August-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF3B-WU7R] (noting that for
the first half of 2020, AT&T reported 1,474 tower dump requests); Verizon Wireless, United
States Report, VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-report/us-report
[https://perma.cc/7KZC-CPHC] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (reporting 1,611 tower dumps for
the same time period); T-MOBILE US, INC., TRANSPARENCY REPORT FOR 2019 6 (2020),
https://www.t-mobile.com/news/_admin/uploads/2020/07/2019-Transparency-Report-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44WZ-JESA] (noting that for fiscal year 2019, T-Mobile reported 6,542
tower dump requests).
48
Amanda Regan, Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: Why the Supreme Court
Should Decide Probable Cause is Not Necessary for Cell Tower Dumps, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1189, 1192 (2015).
49
See MINH TRAN, FCC, ACCURATE LOCATION DETECTION 2 (2015), https://transition.fcc
.gov/pshs/911/Apps%20Wrkshp%202015/911_Help_SMS_WhitePaper0515.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/SP6F-U4MU]. In addition, retrospective analyses of individual intervals are coarser,
only placing someone within a wider area. Mike Masnick, Turns Out Cell Phone Location
Data Is Not Even Close To Accurate, But Everyone Falls For It, TECHDIRT (Sept. 9, 2014), htt
ps://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140908/04435128452/turns-out-cell-phone-location-data-i
s-not-even-close-to-accurate-everyone-falls-it.shtml [https://perma.cc/S7BG-YM
65].
50
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING (2016), https:/
/www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-Primer_Fin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR5S-D7CL].
51
TRAN, supra note 49.
52
Id.
53
Justin McCurry, Josh Taylor, Eleanor Ainge Roy & Michael Safi, George Floyd:
Protests Take Place in Cities Around the World, GUARDIAN (June 1, 2020, 7:08), https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/01/george-floyd-protests-take-place-in-cities-around-theworld [https://perma.cc/Q6AT-9CXR].
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How intrusive or harmful a tower dump is depends on the person
experiencing the intrusion. Even a small incursion or seemingly small weight
on a scale that limits the size of protests or propensity to protest can be quite
powerful for First Amendment purposes.54 If protestors understand the
government is collecting a database of their whereabouts, associations,
behaviors, and ideological beliefs, they will fear how this information will be
used and become deterred from protesting.55
This chilling effect on free speech can have “direct negative
implications for democratic governance and social progress.”56 Therefore,
even if government use of tower dumps does not physically prevent
individuals from protesting, the chilling effect of the surveillance can deter
them from demonstrating. Our understanding of technology has changed
over time, and in turn made the harm more tangible despite feeling less
perceptibly intrusive than a physical halt to a demonstration. As we grow
more sophisticated about our understanding of technology, we are able to
recognize information gathering is more precise, pervasive, and portable.
Surveillance often functions as a chain. What begins as data collection turns
into data aggregation, which becomes ripe for misuse without the need for a
warrant.57
Protestors’ speech may be chilled even if their data is not misused
immediately following a demonstration. Chilling effects are often predicated
on fear. More specifically, “[f]ear or suspicion that one’s speech is being
54
Plaintiffs arguing First Amendment claims must “prove only that the officials’ actions
would have chilled or silenced ‘a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment
activities,’ not that their speech and petitioning were ‘actually inhibited or suppressed.’” White
v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
55
See Letter from H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform to Acting Secretary of Homeland
Sec. Chad F. Wolf (June 5, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.hous
e.gov/files/2020-06-05.CBM%20et.%20al%20to%20Wolf-%20DHS%20re%20Peaceful%2
0Protestors_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5U5-48HG] (“This administration has undermined the
First Amendment freedoms of Americans of all races who are rightfully protesting George
Floyd’s killing.”); Lauren Feiner, We Don’t Know How Protests are Being Surveilled. Here’s
Why That’s a Problem, CNBC (June 13, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/0
6/13/researchers-politicians-call-for-transparency-in-protest-surveillance.html [https://perma
.cc/NAV4-FQDC] (“It’s actually scary to imagine how much of our data bodies are kind of
within law enforcement systems and how that will be weaponized against us.”).
56
Kelsey Cora Skaggs, Surveilling Speech and Association: NSA Surveillance Programs
and the First Amendment, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479, 1494 (2016).
57
“Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the
domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence
gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent.” United
States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) [hereinafter
Keith].
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monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a
seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and
constructive ideas.”58 The fact a portended harm does not occur immediately
does not negate that a harm exists. The fear of that harm can be the harm
itself.59 In the context of law enforcement monitoring protests, the concern is
not necessarily that acquired data will be misused, but mistrust that it will be
misused.60 The scenario and its burden in question here are distinct from that
in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, discussed further in Section B of
this Part, in which respondents failed to sufficiently plead that the challenged
data collection was happening at all.61 Here, the debated question is not
whether tower dumps are used and systematize location data, but whether
fear of how that data will be utilized is sufficient to trigger First Amendment
concerns. The number of advice guides provided by civil rights
organizations, technology experts, activists, and mainstream media outlets
demonstrates evidence of concern of misuse.62

58
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON L.
ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF JUST., THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202 (1967)
(internal marks omitted)).
59
See Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2020)
(internal citation omitted) (“A chilling of First Amendment rights can constitute a cognizable
injury, so long as the chilling effect is not ‘based on a fear of future injury that itself [is] too
speculative to confer standing.’”); Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political
Profiling, Surveillance, and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 647 (2004) (“Many
are afraid to speak out when they know, or even suspect, that their speech is being
monitored.”).
60
See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (2002)
(“Being watched can destroy a person’s peace of mind, increase her self-consciousness and
uneasiness to a debilitating degree, and can inhibit her daily activities.”); Bacchi & AsherSchapiro, supra note 22 (“Privacy activists worry that by making it harder for protesters to
remain anonymous, surveillance technology deployed by authorities around the globe could
have a chilling effect on demonstrations, dissuading people from participating.”).
61
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411 (2013) (“[I]t is no surprise that
respondents fail to offer any evidence that their communications have been monitored
under § 1881a, a failure that substantially undermines their standing theory . . . respondents
do not even allege that the Government has sought the FISC’s approval for surveillance of
their communications.”).
62
See Surveilling Self-Defense, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jun. 2, 2020), https://ssd.eff.org
/en/module/attending-protest [https://perma.cc/9TFJ-V7BH]; Barbara Krasnoff, Android 101:
How to Stop Location Tracking, VERGE (Aug. 25, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com
/21401280/android-101-location-tracking-history-stop-how-to [https://perma.cc/FB8C-LV2
Q]; Jamie Friedlander, How to Turn Off Location Services on Your iPhone and Prevent Apps
from Tracking You, BUS. INSIDER (April 11, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.c
om/how-to-turn-off-location-on-iphone [https://perma.cc/LK5A-HM3A]; Maddy Varner,
How Do I Prepare My Phone for a Protest?, FAST COMPANY (June 6, 2020), https://www.fas
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B. WHAT’S A COURT TO DO?

When a sufficient harm to the First Amendment is demonstrated, as
above, certain protections are triggered. An entire body of freedom of
association law developed over decades paying homage to the sense of
importance of people coming together for a common cause.63 For example,
the Court concluded in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson that “[i]t is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.”64 In particular, the NAACP refused to comply with a court order
demanding it produce the names and addresses of all its Alabama members
and detail their roles within the organization.65 In acknowledging that
“compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may
constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association,” the Court was
satisfied with the NAACP’s proffered evidence that its ability to pursue its
beliefs would be adversely affected.66 The past occasions of threats, public
hostility, and potential loss of employment were enough for the Court to
believe members may have been induced to withdraw from the NAACP and
dissuade others from joining “because of fear of exposure of their beliefs
shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”67
The interplay of government action and private community responses was

tcompany.com/90513609/how-do-i-prepare-my-phone-for-a-protest [https://perma.cc/7J32EFAC] (“David Huerta, a digital security trainer at the Freedom of the Press Foundation,
says protesters should be prepared for surveillance of their cellphone’s transmissions—
even if they don’t make any calls.”).
63
See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1960) (“[T]o compel a teacher to disclose
his every associational tie is to impair that teacher’s right of free association, a right closely
allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free
society.”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 568
(1995) (holding that parades are exercises of the right to expressive association, because of
the “inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point . . . .”); Gregory v. City of Chi., 394
U.S. 111, 112 (1969) (“Petitioners’ march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere
of conduct protected by the First Amendment”); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
235 (1963) (holding that expressing grievances to the government by protesting and marching
“reflect[ed] an exercise of these basic constitutional rights.”); Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. &
Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006) (noting expressive association includes the right
to associate “for the purpose of speaking.”).
64
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
65
Id. at 451.
66
Id. at 462.
67
Id. at 463.
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crucial in this assessment.68 The chilling effect was the fear of what forced
revelation of associations would bring.69
In explaining the standard for government regulation, the majority
contended even “[s]tate action which may have the effect of curtailing the
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”70 The sacredness of
associating with whom you want—for purposes of expressing shared beliefs
and ideologies—is fundamental to the First Amendment.71 The chilling effect
in Patterson focused on forced disclosure of membership lists when the
Court had yet to “contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology.”72
The use of triangulation to identify and systematize groups of people
protesting against police brutality through cell tower dumps threatens
freedom to associate much in the same way forcing disclosure of formal
membership lists did. Membership lists helped the government identify and
categorize individuals based on trends in political ideologies and associations
with the NAACP,73 while triangulation can help law enforcement identify
common groups of people protesting police brutality, ostensibly categorizing
them by common cause and ideology as well. Furthermore, with much of
organizing conducted on social media and other digital platforms, association
with movements is not even confined to formal membership.74
In 2000, more than forty years after Patterson, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that “implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the
First Amendment is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit
of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.”75 Such an emphasis placed on the inviolability of free speech,
assembly, and association—and their intersections—is an important
backdrop in assessing the exceptionality of a protest setting when more
conventional Fourth Amendment questions emerge.
68

Id. It is worth noting, I similarly posit that even if federal or local government officials
conduct tower dumps and administer surveillance programs, revelation of association with
Black Lives Matter or other protests can result in retaliatory responses from private
communities.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 460–61 (emphasis added).
71
Id. at 460.
72
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
73
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464–65.
74
See Brooke Auxier, Activism on Social Media Varies by Race and Ethnicity, Age,
Political Party, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jul. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/202
0/07/13/activism-on-social-media-varies-by-race-and-ethnicity-age-political-party [https://pe
rma.cc/CM6B-CCEE]; Ovide, supra note 12.
75
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
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First Amendment doctrine has long considered chilling effects to be
significant encroachments on personal liberty.76 In the annals of First
Amendment law, the courts have found that “informal censorship” may
sufficiently inhibit certain behaviors.77 In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
Rhode Island formed a commission to “educate the public” on obscene
materials and recommend prosecutions for violations.78 Although the
Commission could only apply informal sanctions, the Court found “the threat
of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and
intimidation . . . demonstrates that the Commission deliberately set about to
achieve the suppression of publications deemed ‘objectionable’ and
succeeded in its aim.”79 Freedom of expressive association, therefore, can
only “be overridden by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”80 In
sum, due to the sacredness of the freedom to associate, government
regulations that chill free speech must meet strict judicial standards to pass
constitutional muster.
C. AVOID THE QUESTION, APPARENTLY

The courts once took seriously the bounds of permissible incursion on
the freedom of association. Of note in this arena is the importance of privacy
and the threat of indirect restraints on speech.81 Since then, courts have
vacillated between sidestepping First Amendment questions that intersect
with privacy concerns and acknowledging the harm of mass data collection

76
See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
77
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963).
78
Id. at 59–60.
79
Id. at 67–68. (The Court further described ways in which the Commission’s threats
manifested themselves in censorial actions, including that “[t]hese acts and practices directly
and designedly stopped the circulation of publications in many parts of Rhode Island.”).
80
Dale, 530 U.S. at 640–41.
81
See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462; Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“But as we have
noted, the fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does
not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’
undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular religious
faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this
nature.”).
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on First Amendment activity.82 This Section will trace this judicial
inconsistency before arguing that the original commitment to freedom of
association should reign in the digital age.
In the landmark Keith case, the Court balanced concerns regarding
internal subversion and citizens’ rights to privacy.83 First, the government
argued that the state was excepted from a federal law’s warrant requirement
for wiretaps because of national security concerns.84 Recognizing the
convergence of the First and Fourth Amendments in national security
matters, the Court acknowledged the heightened protections needed when
surveillance targets are suspected “of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs”
and because “[t]he danger to political dissent is acute where the Government
attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic
security.’”85 While the Court held that a warrant was required on solely
Fourth Amendment grounds, it importantly noted that “[o]fficial
surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing
intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected
privacy of speech.”86 Such an acknowledgment shows the Court’s concern
with domestic surveillance of First Amendment activities and the room to
expand Keith to account for novel First Amendment problems raised by such
surveillance.
The Court long ago flagged this intersecting problem in a string of
seminal freedom of association cases.87 It then spent several decades
avoiding the issue, often saying that mass data collection was either not truly
at issue or was not that damaging.88 Some lower court cases were brought on
82
See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 2–3 (1972); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
83
United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972)
(noting the need for government safeguards “does not make the employment by Government
of electronic surveillance a welcome development—even when employed with restraint and
under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding
citizens.”).
84
Id. at 303.
85
Id. at 314.
86
Id. at 320.
87
See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (acknowledging
the intersection of freedom of association and privacy); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960) (recognizing the “vital relationship” between freedom to associate and privacy);
Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963) (recognizing the “vital
relationship” between freedom to associate and privacy).
88
See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (noting the complaints of surveillance
activities were nonspecific and contained no allegations of illegal activity).
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exclusive Fourth Amendment grounds but still sparked conversation about
the potential First Amendment questions.89 In Klayman v. Obama, a case
challenging the NSA’s metadata program, Judge Leon presciently warned in
his district court opinion of the “Orwellian technology that enables the
Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user
in the United States.”90
Other cases in this jurisprudential era asked the courts more explicitly
to take on First Amendment questions, only to be sidestepped in favor of
procedural or technical grounds.91 In Laird v. Tatum, activists alleged the
Army’s domestic surveillance program violated First Amendment rights to
protest.92 The Court considered and decided the action on the basis of
ripeness. It held that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm.”93 The Court’s ripeness analysis seemed to overlap with its
discussions on the merits. A diffuse fear of a surveillance system or policy,
the majority argued, did not pose enough of a chilling effect on First
Amendment rights.94 Though the Court acknowledged that constitutional

89
See Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (addressing a challenge to
NSA’s metadata program on explicit Fourth Amendment grounds); United States v. Moalin,
973 F.3d 977, 985–87 (9th Cir. 2020) (detailing how defendants accused of providing material
support to al-Shabaab, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, challenged the government’s
collection of metadata on Fourth Amendment grounds).
90
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2013).
91
See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding, in a case
challenging the NSA’s metadata program, that “because we find that the telephone metadata
program exceeds the bounds of what is authorized by § 215, we need not reach either
constitutional issue, and we see no reason to discuss the First Amendment claims in greater
depth”); Laird, 408 U.S. at 12–13; Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013);
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition, or a Writ of Certiorari, at 35, In re Elec.
Priv. Info. Ctr., 571 U.S. 1023 (2013) (No. 13-58) (petitioning to the Supreme Court regarding
the NSA’s metadata collection program, challenging the program in part on First Amendment
grounds, and arguing the “NSA does not need the contents of communications to stifle EPIC’s
advocacy. The metadata alone is sufficient to identify who has been talking to EPIC and to
chill those communications and associations.”).
92
Laird, 408 U.S. at 2. President Johnson ordered federal troops to assist with “civil
disorders” that arose in the wake of Martin Luther King’s assassination, and the Army’s datagathering system was purportedly “established in connection with the development of more
detailed and specific contingency planning designed to permit the Army when called upon to
assist local authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a minimum of force.” Id. at 5.
93
Id. at 13–14.
94
Id. at 13.
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violations may arise from the deterrent effects of governmental action,95 it
declined to conduct a First Amendment analysis because of the factual
differences between the matter at hand and past chilling effects cases.96
Similarly, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court did not
consider the merits of a First Amendment argument, but rather decided a
challenge to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
on standing grounds.97 The Court relied on its previous reasoning in Laird
when discounting the First Amendment harm posed by subjective fear of
government surveillance programs in Clapper.98 Based on its standards for
standing, Clapper99 seems entirely incompatible with Patterson, where the
Court found fear of both government and private community misuse of
disclosed membership information sufficient to confer standing and
demonstrate a chilling effect on the right to associate.100 As discussed, the
Clapper court found the fear of potential government misuse of surveilled
data insufficient to confer standing.101
Despite the Court’s seeming categorization of fear of government
surveillance as an unmeritorious First Amendment burden in both Laird and
Clapper, it took pains to formally decide the cases on other grounds.102 In
Laird, the position of the petitioners was deemed insufficient because they
failed to establish the foreseeability of the military’s misuse of their data. 103
No endorsement of the government’s policy was offered.104 Dissenting
opinions criticized categorizing the harm as speculative and remote, instead
arguing a “present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of
their First Amendment rights” is the proper test for justiciability.105 In
Clapper, the Court held respondents failed to demonstrate a “certainly
impending” harm.106 Clapper can perhaps be narrowly distinguished from
95
Id. at 11 (“In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the
individual’s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from
the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency
might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to that individual.”).
96
Id.
97
568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
98
Id. at 418.
99
Id. at 410.
100
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
101
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401–02.
102
See cases cited supra note 100; supra note 88.
103
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1972)
104
Id. at 15.
105
Id. at 25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal marks and citation omitted).
106
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 417.
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Patterson in that plaintiff’s attorneys in the former asserted their own
behavior was chilled by government surveillance,107 while in the latter,
plaintiffs argued their members’ behavior was chilled due to fear of
retaliation.108 However, this distinction is unavailing and Clapper was
wrongly decided, for chilling effects turn on the practical effects of
discouraging constitutionally protected behavior rather than outright
prohibitions of them.109 Thus, the principles espoused in Patterson should
have carried over to the Court’s reasoning in Clapper. It is unlikely a
protestor will ever be able to perfectly predict the retaliatory behaviors of
government officials or private community members as a result of
infringements on associational rights; the justified fear of misuse of data is
itself sufficiently inhibiting for purposes of a chilling effect analysis.110
While decades of decisions showed the Court’s reluctance to confront
the merits of First Amendment claims in the surveillance context,111 a
renewed willingness is emerging. For example, the Court has shown
increased sensitivity to the problems of mass data collection beginning with

107

Id. at 406 (discussing how respondents were human rights attorneys and other
organizations who feared surveillance of conversations with clients).
108
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958) (“[W]e think it
apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner’s Alabama membership is likely to affect
adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster
beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to
withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure
of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure.”).
109
Id. at 461 (citing Am. Commc’ns Ass’n C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393 (1950)).
110
George Joseph, Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson,
INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 1:50 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documents-showdepartment-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson [https://perma.
cc/9BHE-U594] (An activist said in an interview that “[s]urveillance is a tool of fear. When
the police are videotaping you at a protest or pulling you over because you’re a well known
activist — all of these techniques are designed to create a chilling effect on people’s
organizing. This is no different.”); Amna Toor, “Our Identity is Often What’s Triggering
Surveillance”: How Government Surveillance of #BlackLivesMatter Violates the First
Amendment Freedom of Association, 44 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 286, 293 (2018)
(“[G]overnment surveillance of associations acts as a censor in deterring individuals from
freely engaging with one another.”).
111
See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (decided First Amendment challenge to
domestic surveillance program on basis of ripeness); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 401 (2013) (decided challenge to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 on surveillance grounds rather than considering merits of First Amendment
argument).
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Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in U.S. v. Jones,112 and moving through
Justice Roberts’s opinions in Riley v. California113 and Carpenter v. United
States.114 While the aforementioned cases were not raised on First
Amendment grounds, its themes were discussed. In her 2012 Jones
concurrence, Justice Sotomayor sounded the alarms on First Amendment
themes, pointing out the amenability of government surveillance technology
to misuse, because “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”115 Her concern that unfettered
government discretion to acquire information about citizens could “alter the
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to
democratic society”116 is echoed in other recent privacy cases.117 As will be
shown in Part II, the Court has yet to grapple with the tension between its
newfound awareness of the harms of mass data collection in these Fourth
Amendment cases and its legacy of dodging First Amendment issues.118
However, the Court is now at an opportune moment to revisit its brush with
First Amendment analyses in the novel privacy context.
Given how dynamically surveillance tools have developed in the
modern protest setting,119 it is not entirely surprising that the courts have yet
to apply a consistent doctrinal framework when such issues arise. But with
the scope of surveillance120 and the infrastructure of protest activities scaling

112
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive
freedoms.”).
113
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“Modern cell phones are not just another
technological convenience . . . The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.”).
114
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (“The Government’s position
fails to contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of
not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and
years.”).
115
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
116
Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum,
J., concurring), vacated, Cuevas-Perez v. U.S., 566 U.S. 1189 (2012)) (internal citation
omitted).
117
See, e.g., Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
118
See infra Part II.
119
See Greenberg & Newman, supra note 31; Roberts, supra note 31; Garcia-Navarro,
supra note 31.
120
Marguerite Rigoglioso, Civil Liberties and Law in the Era of Surveillance, STANFORD
LAW. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/civil-liberties-and-la
w-in-the-era-of-surveillance [https://perma.cc/B5SD-5V8C].
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up since the 1970s,121 avoiding First Amendment questions will become
impracticable. The deleterious purpose and effects of the surveillance tactics
as Justice Douglas recognized them are eerily similar to those posed by tower
dumps.122 The Laird plaintiffs’ fear that “permanent reports of their activities
will be maintained in the Army’s data bank”123 reflects current fears shared
by nearly two-thirds of Americans who are concerned about how government
collects and uses the data of citizens it surveils.124 Members of Congress
concerned with surveillance tactics employed against protestors also pointed
to the recent spike in downloads for encrypted messaging apps “during recent
demonstrations, showing a broad concern of surveillance among
protesters.”125 As will be shown, this growing problem cannot sufficiently be
handled with the Fourth Amendment alone.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Part II argues that despite the judicial tendency to rely on the Fourth
Amendment when assessing the legality of government surveillance tactics,
it is an unreliable doctrinal framework. More specifically, Part II posits that
First Amendment concerns are not sufficiently addressed by the modern

121

Ronald Brownstein, The Rage Unifying Boomers and Gen Z, ATLANTIC (June 18,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/todays-protest-movements-areas-big-as-the-1960s/613207 [https://perma.cc/779J-28M8] (noting recent protests are larger
than those in the 1960s and more democratized).
122
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 25 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he charge is that
the purpose and effect of the system of surveillance is to harass and intimidate the respondents
and to deter them from exercising their rights of political expression, protest, and dissent ‘by
invading their privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely affecting their employment and
their opportunities for employment, and in other ways.’ Their fear is that ‘permanent reports
of their activities will be maintained in the Army’s data bank, and their ‘profiles’ will appear
in the so-called ‘Blaklist’ [sic] and that all of this information will be released to numerous
federal and state agencies upon request.’”).
123
Id.
124
Brooke Auxier, Lee Raine, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin & Erica Turner,
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their
Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/interne
t/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-overtheir-personal-information [https://perma.cc/727R-8C9M].
125
Letter from 116th Cong., to Christopher Wray, Director, FBI 2 (June 9, 2020) https://e
shoo.house.gov/sites/eshoo.house.gov/files/Eshoo-Rush%20Ltr%20to%20FBI%2C%20NG
%2C%20CBP%2C%20DEA%20on%20government%20surveillance%20of%20protesters%
20-%206.9.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AEH-WEFP] (citing Nicolas Rivero, Signal App
Downloads Spike as US Protesters Seek Message Encryption, QUARTZ (June 4, 2020), https:/
/qz.com/1864846/signal-app-downloads-spike-as-us-protesters-seek-messageencryption [htt
ps://perma.cc/DF7U-TLBQ]).
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privacy cases. Alone, the Fourth Amendment cannot be used to determine
whether tower dump requests for data gathered during First Amendmentprotected activity should proceed without a warrant.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S DOCTRINAL INADEQUACY

At the highest level, the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.126 Trespasses are searches,127 as are
violations of reasonable expectations of privacy.128 The warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment129 can only be bypassed through certain
exceptions.130 The Supreme Court has held that acquiring certain types of cell
phone location data constitutes a search,131 but has not yet ruled on a warrant
requirement for tower dumps specifically.132 The surveillance of protestors
necessarily implicates both the First and Fourth Amendments, particularly
against marginalized groups.133 Yet recent jurisprudence is almost entirely
focused on novel privacy concerns—more specifically, how privacy is
invaded by modern technology—and how certain electronic devices or data
should be protected, or not, under only the Fourth Amendment.134
However, at best, the Fourth Amendment would provide uncertain
protection in this realm. To start, no Supreme Court case has specifically
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012).
128
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
130
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). Exceptions include, but are not limited
to, certain searches incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, administrative searches, stop and
frisk, certain automobile searches, and custodial searches. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of
the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985).
131
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that GPS tracking was a search under the Fourth
Amendment); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (holding that a warrant is required
to search digital data on a phone seized during an arrest, which involves greater privacy
interests than a traditional inspection of an arrestee’s pockets); Carpenter v. United States, 138
S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (holding that the government needs a warrant before acquiring CSLI
from a cell carrier).
132
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (declining to rule on tower dumps).
133
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework
for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 Emory L.J. 527, 553 (2017).
134
See Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historical Location Surveillance after
United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 803, 809 (2013); Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can
Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 411 (2018).
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addressed tower dumps.135 The most recent Fourth Amendment cases
assuredly began to grapple with what technological innovations could make
their way into existing privacy doctrine.136 In the oft-cited concurring opinion
in Jones, Justice Sotomayor presaged the dangers of expansiveness of
government surveillance, and the futility of a trespassory test in dealing with
forms of surveillance that do not require physical invasion.137 In
acknowledging “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms,” Justice Sotomayor went on to
question “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs . . . .”138
However, Jones dealt with long-term CSLI monitoring.139 Tower dumps are
not long-term monitoring. They are captures of individual intervals, of a
moment in time, or with triangulation, many moments in time.140
Nor are tower dumps examples of long-term monitoring of individual
persons, as addressed in Carpenter.141 The majority took time to distinguish
that cell location information is not “shared” in a typical sense because of its
ubiquity in everyday life, and deals with an exhaustive amount of location
data incomparable to the limited data dealt with in Smith.142 It is a detailed
record of physical locations over a prolonged time, rather than discrete uses.
The privacy concerns, the Court reasoned, were greater in Carpenter than in
Jones, as individuals compulsively carry cell phones with them, whereas they
regularly leave their vehicles.143 The Court moves incrementally in extending
protections to technologies whose “tracking partakes of many of the
qualities” of technologies addressed in previous cases.144 However, they

The Court in Carpenter specifically declined to rule on “[r]eal-time CSLI or ‘tower
dumps.’” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
136
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that GPS tracking was a search under the Fourth
Amendment); Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (holding that a warrant is required to search digital data
on a phone seized during an arrest, which involves greater privacy interests than a traditional
inspection of an arrestee’s pockets); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221 (holding that the
government needs a warrant before acquiring CSLI from a cell carrier).
137
Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
138
Id. at 416.
139
Id.
140
See Kelly, supra note 17.
141
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
142
Id. at 2210.
143
Id. at 2218.
144
Id. at 2216.
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specifically have reserved the question of tower dumps.145 And given that
tower dumps generally track “a person’s movement at a particular time,” 146
it will be more difficult to argue a Fourth Amendment violation under
Carpenter. Unless used in combination with other surveillance tools, or
spanned across a large timeframe and radius, tower dumps are hardly the
“detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day,
every moment, over several years,” that troubled the Court.147 The venture to
persuade the Court will be daunting, given the very narrow conditions under
which it decided Carpenter and its reluctance to make broader
determinations on “conventional surveillance techniques and tools.”148 The
Court could not convincingly answer why tower dumps are not “the
paradigmatic example of ‘too permeating police surveillance’ and a
dangerous tool of ‘arbitrary’ authority,”149 demonstrating the existing hurdles
to extending Carpenter.
B. JUDICIAL MANEUVERING TO FAVOR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IGNORES THE PROBLEM

The courts have repeatedly sidestepped a First Amendment inquiry
when they are able to maneuver judgments on other technical grounds or
Fourth Amendment doctrine.150 While a school of thought exists positing
courts should have an extremely limited role in deciding cases and
controversies, the judiciary’s decision to ignore First Amendment
implications is not an example of laudable minimalism. 151 Consistently
forcing free speech-adjacent issues into a Fourth Amendment prism is a
refusal to address the developing constitutional threats posed by advancing
145

Id. at 2220.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
149
Id.
150
See Farrah Bara, From Memphis, with Love: A Model to Protect Protestors in the Age
of Surveillance, 69 DUKE L.J. 197, 208 (2019) (“Courts typically analyze surveillance under
the Fourth Amendment”); Hannah Fuson, Fourth Amendment Searches in First Amendment
Spaces: Balancing Free Association with Law and Order in the Age of the Surveillance State,
50 U. MEM. L. REV. 231, 266 (2019) (“First Amendment surveillance cases are not prevalent
among the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.”); Caitlin Thistle, A First Amendment Breach: The
National Security Agency’s Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1197,
1198 (2008) (“Legal commentators have not paid much attention to the additional and
independent First Amendment concerns with the NSA program . . . .”).
151
Minimalist judges focus on the specifics before the court and try to avoid venturing
too “far beyond the problem at hand.” Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43
TULSA L. REV. 825, 826 (2008).
146
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technology used by law enforcement, rather than a principled adherence to a
judicial preference for case-by-case judgment.152 Addressing the First
Amendment implications of government technology such as tower dumps is
not inconsistent with minimalism; in fact, First Amendment doctrine often
favors particularized adjudication.153 As will be shown in Part III, the courts
can and should conduct case-by-case analyses utilizing balancing factors
under the First Amendment. The problem with the jurisprudential history of
cases dealing with government technology is not courts’ need to have a
limited counter-majoritarian role and rule as narrowly as possible, but rather,
that the First Amendment is a better vehicle for these issues.
Irrespective of a specific potential expansion of Carpenter, given the
sheer breadth of technological tools used by law enforcement—which will
only continue to rapidly develop—the surveillance of protest activities
should automatically trigger First Amendment protections. Some privacy
proponents have argued for the expansion of Supreme Court trends
precluding warrantless government acquisition of individuals’ locations.154
Such scholarship argues that First Amendment concerns posed by
government tracking require the Court to extend Fourth Amendment privacy
protections to freedom of association matters.155 However, the Fourth
Amendment alone is unsuitable for determining the permissibility of
warrantless tower dumps in the protest setting. Fourth Amendment doctrine
is often narrowly applied, overly permissive, and has yet to convincingly
acknowledge the unique importance of the freedom of association.156 And
despite the constant overlap between the First and Fourth Amendments,
152

Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN L. REV. 1899, 1902 (2006)
(discussing certain judges’ preference for case-by-case analyses instead of bright-line rules,
which often result in narrow rulings instead of broad clarifications of law).
153
For example, the Supreme Court has held that a First Amendment right of public access
hinges on passage of the “experience and logic” test. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of
Calif. for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). See also W. Robert Gray, Public and Private
Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 72 n.398 (1994) (“Defamation law in this sense is ideologically neutral,
and therefore is remitted to a [case-by-case] balancing test.”) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988).
154
Brief for Ctr. for Competitive Pol. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4,
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
155
Id.
156
See Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to do the Work of the First?, 127
YALE L.J. FORUM 444, 445 (2017) (discussing the differences between the First and Fourth
Amendments, particularly that the latter ignores the “cumulative” effects of privacy invasions
and offers weaker protections); Bara, supra note 150, at 208 (arguing that First Amendment
protections are broader than Fourth Amendment protections).
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courts’ predilection for Fourth Amendment analyses has only demonstrated
the shortfalls of its application. Filling a gap in Fourth Amendment law does
not do away with the First Amendment concerns raised by government
surveillance of protests; in fact, the “development of a ‘First Amendment
criminal procedure’ might begin to close the gaps in Fourth Amendment
coverage by providing for the protection of First Amendment-protected
behavior that is likely chilled by targeted police surveillance . . . .”157
When protestors’ rights hang in the balance, they are not protected by
an avoidance of the use of First Amendment doctrine, because the Fourth
Amendment does little in its absence. A case-by-case analysis using Fourth
Amendment precedent alone is insufficient to address the confluence of
chilling effects when surveillance technology is used. Reliance on the Fourth
Amendment would have been more appropriate in an era such as the 1970s,
because surveillance posing a chilling effect was more difficult to achieve
prior to the digital revolution. The courts have dealt with this issue in criminal
procedure incrementally, but their decisions are continuously outpaced by
the sophistication of digital advancement. As the universe of publicly
available information has expanded, much more government activity can
pass muster without violating the Fourth Amendment if the potential First
Amendment infringements are sidelined. Whatever the Fourth Amendment
currently says about tower dumps, or similar surveillance technology, we
need to think about First Amendment issues first. Further, the Court’s
expressed concern about potential infringement on freedom of association
demonstrates a conceivable willingness to embark on independent First
Amendment inquiries.
III. IT ALL COMES DOWN TO THE FIRST
Part III considers the shortcomings of the Fourth Amendment and the
unique First Amendment harms posed by government technologies to
suggest a new framework for courts to utilize when protestor speech is chilled
by state surveillance.
Under the First Amendment, impairments of the right to associate must
withstand exacting scrutiny.158 In turn, protestors’ freedom of association
should only be permissibly overridden “by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
157
Matthew A. Wasserman, First Amendment Limitations on Police Surveillance: The
Case of the Muslim Surveillance Program, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786, 1789 (2015).
158
Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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freedoms.”159 This standard holds even “if any deterrent effect on the exercise
of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but
indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s
conduct.”160 Whether the use of tower dumps during protests is so tailored is
a determination the courts must make while taking into consideration the
stark differences in how government actors chill free speech in the pre- and
post-digital age where social media platforms and smart devices play a large
role in the dissemination of information.
A common thread in recent landmark Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is the consistent reminder that past Fourth Amendment case law cannot be
mechanically applied on top of new digital age searches.161 There is no reason
the same pragmatic approach should not apply to First Amendment cases.
The insight gleaned from recent Fourth Amendment cases is important in
considering new First Amendment concerns as applied against older First
Amendment rules. Rather than formulaically applying existing rules to
unprecedented facts, courts must be open-minded to crafting new protections
for new challenges. Law enforcement’s use of tower dumps to surveil alleged
suspects of crimes involved in protests, which inexorably results in tracking
a large swath of protestors, is one example of a conventional Fourth
Amendment issue that implicates the First Amendment.162 Other surveillance
tools such as geofences, stingrays, and drones could trigger First Amendment
concerns and require an independent analysis as well.163 There is no magic
formula to decide the permissibility of law enforcement actions when free
speech and privacy issues are at the fore. The point is, rather, that when both
are implicated, conduct cannot only be assessed under the Fourth
Amendment, but must also be assessed under the First Amendment.
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Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000).
Clark, 750 F.2d at 94 (internal citation omitted).
161
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018) (“When confronting new
concerns wrought by digital technology, this Court has been careful not to uncritically extend
existing precedents.”); ); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 394 (2014) (“We expect that the
gulf between physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen in the
future.”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“This
approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”); Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001) (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more
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Though there are some differences between the surveillance in prior
freedom of association cases and in tower dumps,164 they do not preclude an
application of the doctrinal tests or constitutional thresholds for permissible
or impermissible encroachments on First Amendment rights. Otherwise put,
courts should be able to apply the test for freedom of association
encroachments to tower dumps in a protest setting. Highly sophisticated
technological tools that can instantaneously unmask everyone at a First
Amendment-protected event, such as a protest against police brutality, were
not available when the Court recognized the “vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations” in 1958.165 However,
tower dumps are akin to forced disclosure of digital databases of protest
participants like in Patterson.166
This Comment’s proposes a judicial framework that balances various
factors of the challenged state conduct to address the chilling effects of
government surveillance on protestor speech.167 These surveillance program
factors include: 1) the breadth of the program; 2) the intent of the program;
3) the government’s interest in the data to be collected; and 4) the level of
aggregation resulting from the program. The judicial scrutiny in freedom of
association cases necessarily involves balancing these factors, requiring each
surveillance program to be assessed individually.
While it has been argued that balancing tests often have deleterious
results for those seeking vindication for alleged constitutional violations,168
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Patterson addressed compelled disclosure of membership lists which belonged to the
NAACP. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958) (“Over petitioner’s
objections, the court ordered the production of a substantial part of the requested records,
including the membership lists, . . . ”). In the matter of tower dumps to identify protestors, law
enforcement is not demanding disclosure of membership lists directly from Black Lives
Matter or another analogous organization, but rather, seeks the data from phone companies.
See Remington, supra note 18 (“The police can then go back to the phone company and ask
for identifying information.”).
165
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
166
Id. at 451.
167
Given the complexities of the interrelated issues at hand, such as the varying scopes
and targets of the surveillance tools, brightlinebright line rules are best to be avoided, in favor
of a dynamic test that considers multiple factors. How the courts would procedurally apply
freedom of association doctrine to government surveillance challenges would depend on both
factors related to the surveillance program itself, and at what stage of the judicial process the
program is being challenged.
168
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales
Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1266 (1988)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness or balancing test “has the effect of
eroding the fundamental privacy and liberty rights protected by the fourth amendment.”).
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a multi-factor analysis is still the superior path for the judiciary to chart given
the complexities of government surveillance technology and its uses. The
most axiomatic advantage of this factor test is that the presence of a test at
all is superior to the absence of one. Secondly, while the use of balancing
was historically attacked in the mid-twentieth century for “the illiberal results
it produced in free speech cases,”169 it was indisputably an important tool in
the seminal associational rights cases mentioned at length in this Comment,
and has been used in First Amendment cases even more in the past
decades.170 Judicial discretion can be used in a balancing assessment to tip
the scales in favor of the government—as has been done in Fourth
Amendment cases—but bright line rules regarding the permissibility of
proffered legitimate law enforcement investigatory tactics are more
susceptible to discretionary abuse than a process that takes into consideration
the nuances of a program and the impact on the target of surveillance. So
long as there is transparency about the “valuation standards”171 and courts
avoid nebulous declarations that appropriate conclusions were reached
without clarifying the interests considered, a balancing test is the fairest way
to adapt to the technological advancements of both government surveillance
and modern protest. These factors will help the court more pragmatically
assess the potential chilling effects of government technology, while taking
into consideration the nuances of investigatory policies and assessing which
tactics cross the line into overly invasive surveillance.
A. SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM

The scope of a government surveillance program is an important factor
in this Comment’s suggested framework. For example, whether tower dumps
are contemplated within a broader surveillance program or operate as
individual, non-systemic police requests will result in a different First
Amendment burden requirement. Lower courts have noted the lack of
consistent guidance in determining when “a surveillance system became so
intrusive as to create a reasonable or objective chill in a plaintiff and therefore
present a justiciable controversy.”172 To begin, systematic efforts to identify
protestors will be viewed with more skepticism than isolated tower dumps.
If the Department of Homeland Security has an ambitious program designed
to surveil protestors on a broader scale, a First Amendment chill will be easier
169
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 944 (1987).
170
Id. at 967.
171
Id. at 976.
172
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chi., 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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to prove in court. The prospect of a modern agency-wide surveillance
program specifically targeting protestors would hardly be comparable to
surveillance tactics primarily relying on media reports and agents attending
public meetings.173 Concern in this vein would not turn on the actions of a
single sergeant but rather a police commission developing an anti-protest task
force and instructing all officers to utilize tower dumps to track individuals.
If the program is part of an organized system of multidimensional
surveillance, the analysis would also lean more in favor of protestors. A
government agency tool combining tower dumps, drone surveillance, and
social media monitoring is the exact “unrestrained power to assemble data”
warned of that is “susceptible to abuse.”174 Conversely, courts will be less
likely to find a chilling effect on freedom of association if law enforcement
agents act alone in furtherance of an investigation.
B. INTENT OF THE PROGRAM

Second, the proposed framework assesses the intent of the surveillance
program (or individual tower dump request). National security and legitimate
law enforcement activities are generally considered legitimate state
interests,175 but the relationship between the professed state interest and
invasive burden on protestors depends on what, if any, crime is being
investigated. The burden is on the government to prove its compelling state
interest, which means it must specify and justify its reason for mounting the
program.176 The program also cannot be overbroad.177 For example, a policy
to arbitrarily monitor protestors will be treated differently than one to
investigate serious crimes. The invocation of national security in
investigative duties has been recognized as a “greater jeopardy to
constitutionally protected speech.”178 If a surveillance program using tower
dumps on protestors is justified “under so vague a concept as the power to
protect domestic security,” courts should consider the chilling effect
greater.179 If an agency has a broad policy to use tower dumps to track Black
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Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal
marks omitted).
175
Keith, 407 U.S. at 311 (“Though the Government and respondents debate their
seriousness and magnitude, threats and acts of sabotage against the Government exist in
sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them.”).
176
Clark v. Libr. of Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Skaggs, supra note 56, at 1492.
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E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. at 313.
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Id. at 314.
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Lives Matter protestors under the guise of prophylactic domestic security,
courts should be more skeptical.
If the policy is triggered only when investigating serious crimes
unrelated to core First Amendment activity, courts should be more
deferential to law enforcement. An example of this would be the
investigation of a crime that took place during a demonstration, but whose
surveillance prompting was disconnected from the ideological motivations
of said demonstration. Even then, what crimes are supposedly being
investigated through tower dumps or other surveillance tactics should be
considered. The intrusiveness of location tracking should not be outweighed
by capricious government tactics, such as seeking information on protestors
based on loose accusations of criminal activity. Civil disobedience is an
expected part of protests against governments.180 Reports of tense, but largely
non-violent, encounters between protestors and police officers should not
warrant widescale data acquisition of copious amounts of people in the
vicinity. In a similar vein, while “the Fourth Amendment might permit
officers to track the cellphones of protesters to gather evidence of
jaywalking” or other lesser crimes, “the First Amendment might prohibit that
surveillance as too invasive to be used to investigate an offense so minor.”181
The extant nuances in varying uses of surveillance technology require
independent analyses for the reasons presented; the nature of the
investigation, coupled with the intent behind the surveillance, come in
myriad degrees.
C. GOVERNMENT INTEREST

The government interest in the surveillance program is another
important factor. Even if policies to use tower dumps are only activated to
aid in criminal investigations, as opposed to specifically and broadly target
protestors, the invasiveness of the program’s goals can vary greatly. For
example, exclusive criminal investigatory interests in using tower dumps can
result in divergent objectives, ranging from wanting to identify single
suspects to assembling dossiers on everyone in the vicinity. The narrower the
reach of the program, the more likely it is to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Relatedly, pretextual intent might weigh a court’s analysis in favor of
protestors. If law enforcement is investigating a homicide that happened to
take place at a protest, the inquiry could be more partial to government
interests than the comparatively lesser burden imposed on demonstrators.
180

Harrop A. Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L.J. 228, 229

(1966).
181

Abdo, supra note 156, at 455.
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However, if the crime of investigation is directly related to First Amendment
activity, courts should be especially conscious of the justification. For
example, courts should be skeptical that investigation of minor crimes
closely related to protest activity, such as obstruction of traffic, is worth the
imposed burden.
D. AGGREGATION PRACTICES

Lastly, the aggregation practices that occur within a tower dump request
or broader surveillance policies are important. Tower dumps that discard data
determined irrelevant to the criminal investigation and do not retain relevant
data beyond the needs of the investigation will more likely pass constitutional
muster. This is because a more carefully circumscribed tower dump is more
carefully tailored to the state’s interest in an investigation, as opposed to more
arbitrary and unending data collection of individuals’ information.
Conversely, it will be much more difficult for the government to argue
that a policy for retaining data of a broad swath of loosely grouped people
serves the state’s interest in effective law enforcement investigations, and
that the policy is unrelated to the suppression of ideas.182 Courts may be wary
if law enforcement agents routinely seek data from one cell tower or multiple
towers in a range concerningly far from the original suspected crime scene.
If an alleged crime took place at Chicago’s Millennium Park, for example,
seeking data from cell towers far outside of that range would be overly broad.
Aggregating data of thousands of Black Lives Matter protestors without
linking individuals to specific investigations raises similar concerns as gang
affiliation databases, criticized for defining affiliation too broadly, and that
“carelessly criminalizes people of color, and exposes them to wrongful
arrests, convictions, and deportations.”183
All of these factors are used to determine whether interferences with the
right to freely associate are justified by the government’s legitimate,
compelling interests.184 We know that “by collective effort individuals can
make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or
lost.”185 The power in this collective effort can only be justified through the
most narrow of means, with the most superseding of interests. Given the
historic import conferred on freedom of association, it is clear the courts
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should adopt a First Amendment framework when government surveillance
infringes on that freedom.
CONCLUSION
Government monitoring of perceived dissidents can be traced through
nearly all focal points of civil rights history. Surveillance will continue to
advance with technology, leading to more intrusive tactics that quell free
speech. Despite the advancement of mass data collection in the protest
setting, the courts have yet to confront the First Amendment question in
surveillance matters. But the salience of the issue compels them to. While the
range of surveillance, excessive force, or other First Amendment
infringement allegations differ, lawsuits over law enforcement-protestor
clashes in Portland,186 Seattle,187 Chicago,188 and other cities, will multiply.
At the very least, concerns over government surveillance of protestors will
continue to seep the national consciousness.189
Tower dumps may appear to be seemingly innocuous and un-intrusive
forms of government surveillance on protestors, used in limited intervals to
target individual suspects of crimes allegedly committed during protests.190
186
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However, the continuously reaffirmed privacy concerns posed by
government surveillance, coupled with courts’ reluctance to address the First
Amendment implications of such surveillance, proves it is time to conduct
independent freedom of association inquiries when such matters are
implicated. The breadth and precision of technology will only grow. And
intrusion is a continuous variable that refines itself when new tools emerge
and surveillance programs expand in scope.
Given the threat government data collection poses to the freedom of
association, courts should adopt a First Amendment strict scrutiny standard
when constitutional challenges to surveillance programs arise. A balancing
test involving the scope, intent, government interests, and aggregation
methods of the program should guide courts. While tower dumps are a timely
and threatening surveillance tool that should trigger a First Amendment
analysis, the framework should also apply to similar technologies if they chill
free speech. Only then can we ensure that our voices will be protected.191
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